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Many decisions involve integration of evidence conferred by discrete cues over time. However, the neural mechanism of this integration
is poorly understood. Several decision-making models suggest that integration of evidence is implemented by a dynamic system whose
state evolves toward a stable point representing the decision outcome. The internal dynamics of such point attractormodels render them
sensitive to the temporal gaps between cues because their internal forces push the state forward once it is dislodged from the initial stable
point.We askedwhether human subjects are as sensitive to such temporal gaps. Subjects reported the net direction of stochastic random
dot motion, which was presented in one or two brief observation windows (pulses). Pulse strength and interpulse interval varied
randomly from trial to trial. We found that subjects’ performance was largely invariant to the interpulse intervals up to at least 1 s. The
findings question the implementation of the integration process viamechanisms that rely on autonomous changes of network state. The
mechanism should be capable of freezing the state of the network at a variety of firing rate levels during temporal gaps between the cues,
compatible with a line of stable attractor states.
Introduction
To make decisions, we often gather discrete pieces of evidence
and combine them. Psychologists have long explained this pro-
cess using abstract models based on integration of evidence in
favor of different options (Laming, 1968; Link and Heath, 1975;
Vickers and Smith, 1985; Luce, 1986; Smith, 1988; Link, 1992;
Ratcliff and Smith, 2004). These models accurately explain the
statistics of choices and reaction times. Moreover, electrophysi-
ological studies in primates performing simple perceptual deci-
sions have uncovered a neural correlate of the integration process
in the parietal, prefrontal, and superior colliculus neurons (Cook
and Maunsell, 2002; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Gold and
Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff et al., 2007; Churchland et al., 2008; Kiani
et al., 2008; Heitz and Schall, 2012). Neural responses reflect both
the gradual accumulation of evidence and the termination of the
process when the accumulation reaches a stereotyped level.
Several theoretical studies propose that a common mechanism
can account for both the integration of evidence into a decision
variable (DV) as well as the divergence of such a DV into a terminal
“attractor” state representing the decision outcomes (Brown and
Holmes, 2001;Usher andMcClelland, 2001;Wang, 2002;Wongand
Wang, 2006;Albantakis andDeco, 2011;Miller andKatz, 2013).The
idea is appealing because coupling local recurrent excitation and
lateral inhibition could give rise to both integration and the compe-
tition between alternatives. However, in this framework, the evolu-
tion of a DV is determined by both the input to the network (e.g.,
evidence) and the network interactions themselves. Hence, the DV
will tend todrift away fromstates thatought tobedeterminedpurely
by theevidence.The strongprediction is that sourcesof evidencewill
affect decisions differently if they are separated by gaps in time: The
network interactions cause the decision process to be sensitive to the
lengthof gaps. For longer gaps, either theDVis absorbed intoabasin
of attraction, making later information less effective, or the DV re-
traces back to the starting point, effectively erasing the earlier
information.
We tested this prediction in human observers trained tomake
perceptual decisions about the direction of motion in noisy dy-
namic random dot displays. We provided one motion “pulse” or
a pair of motion pulses separated by different temporal gaps. We
report that (1) subjects are readily able to integrate information
from two visual motion cues to improve their accuracy, (2) per-
formance did not depend on the interval between the cues, and
(3) the second cue had the larger leverage on decisions.
Materials andMethods
Five adult human subjects, three male and two female, participated in
this experiment. All subjects, except for one of the authors (R.K.), were
naive to the purpose of the experiment. Observers had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. They provided informed written consent
before participation in the study. All procedures were approved by the
institutional review board at the University of Washington.
Motion direction discrimination task. Observers were seated in an ad-
justable chair in a semidark room with chin and forehead supported
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before a CRT display monitor (17 inch, PF790,
View Sonic; refresh rate, 75 Hz; screen resolu-
tion, 800 600; viewing distance, 57 cm). Each
trial beganwith the appearance of a red fixation
point (0.3° diameter) at the center of the dis-
play. Subjects were instructed to maintain gaze
on the fixation point throughout the trial. The
subject pressed a keyboard space bar to signal
readiness for the trial. Immediately, two red
targets (0.5° diameter) appeared on the right
and left side of the screen (10° eccentricity) cor-
responding to the two possible motion direc-
tions (rightward and leftward), which the
subject had to discriminate. After a short delay
(200–500 ms, truncated exponential distribu-
tion), the dynamic random dot stimulus was
presented within a 5° circular aperture at the
center of screen. The dots were white 2  2
pixel squares (0.088° per side, luminance 
69.6 cd/m2) on black background (lumi-
nance  0.1 cd/m2), creating an average dot
density of 16.7 dots/degree2/s. The motion
stimulus is described in detail previously (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001;
Roitman and Shadlen, 2002). Briefly, the stimulus consisted of three
independent and interleaved sets of dots presented on successive video
frames. When a set was replotted, three frames (40 ms) later a fraction of
dots was displaced coherently along the motion direction, while the rest
of dots were relocated randomly. The fraction of coherently moving dots
(hereafter termed “coherence”) specified the stimulus strength. Motion
direction and coherence varied randomly from trial to trial. At the end of
motion stimulus, a 400–1000 ms delay period (truncated exponential)
was imposed before the Go signal, disappearance of the fixation point,
was presented. The subject was required to report the net direction of
motion within 1 s after the Go signal by pressing a left or right key.
Distinctive auditory feedback was delivered for correct and error re-
sponses. On trials with 0% coherence, the type of feedback was chosen
randomly.
Subjects were presented with one or two 120-ms-long motion pulses
(Fig. 1). On single-pulse trials, motion coherence was randomly chosen
from these following values: 0%, 3.2%, 6.4%, 12.8%, 25.6%, and 51.2%.
Ondouble-pulse trials, the coherence of each pulse was randomly chosen
from 3.2%, 6.4%, and 12.8%, allowing nine different coherence se-
quences. The two pulses were separated by 0, 120, 360, or 1080 ms. For
the 0ms interpulse interval, the second pulse was a smooth continuation
of the first pulse—the first frame of the second pulse related to the third
to the last frame of the first pulse, and so on—to avoid breaking the
motion. For nonzero interpulse intervals, the second pulse was not a
continuation of the first sequence, but similar resultswere obtainedwhen
the two pulses were related in the same fashion as the 0 ms interpulse
interval. The motion direction was always consistent for the two pulses,
and subjects were informed of this fact. They were also informed that
random fluctuations in the stimulus could produce contradictory direc-
tion percepts for the two pulses, but they had to choose the direction that
best matched the overall stimulus. The 42 possible trial types (6 single-
pulse and 9  4 double-pulse trial types) were randomly interleaved in
blocks 300 trials long. Subjects were instructed to perform as accurately
as possible. Their overall probability of being correct was shown on the
screen at the end of each block and was compared with the instructed
target: 80% probability of being correct, a level of accuracy extremely
difficult to achieve for the brief and mainly weak stimuli used in this
experiment. Each subject ran one or two blocks per day until 2400–3300
trials were collected. The results were largely consistent across subjects.
For the analyses below, we have pooled the data across subjects.
Analysis of behavioral data.Weuse a variety of logistic regressionmod-
els to assess the impact of stimulus parameters on binary outcomes. In
the following models, we use Logit[P] as shorthand for log P1 P and
denote fitted coefficients, i. Fitting is by maximum likelihood under a
binomial error model (i.e., a GLM).
For single-pulse trials, the probability of a correct choice is given by the
following:
Logit[Pcorrect]  0  1C, (1)
whereC is motion coherence. Amodified version of Equation 1 was used
to test for a right/left bias:
Logit[Pright]  0 1C, (2)
where C is signed motion coherence—positive for rightward motion
and negative for leftward motion. The null hypothesis is lack of bias
(H0:0 0).
To evaluate the effect of interpulse interval on performance, we fit the
following:
Logit[Pcorrect]  0 1C1 2C2 3T 4C1T 5C2T, (3)
where C1 and C2 are motion strengths of the first and second pulses,
respectively, and T is the interpulse interval. When applied to double-
pulse trials with equal pulse strength (C1C2), the redundant regression
terms (2C2 and 5C2T ) were dropped. The null hypothesis is that per-
formance does not depend on interpulse interval (H0:3–5 0).
We estimated the expected accuracy (Pe) that would be achieved in
double-pulse trials under the assumption of perfect integration. We as-
sumed that the decision is determined by the sign of the sum of two
random numbers (i.e., the pieces of evidence conferred by the two
pulses). The distribution of the evidence can be inferred from the accu-
racy of the performance on single-pulse trials:
e1  
1P1, 0, 1
e2  
1P2, 0, 1
, (4)
where P1 and P2 are the probabilities of correct single-pulse discrimina-
tions based on Equation 1, and e1 and e2 are the inferred evidence that
underlie P1 and P2, respectively. is the normal cumulative distribution
function:
s, ,   

0
Nv, , dv,
and 1 is its inverse (quantile function). N(v, , ) is the normal
probability density function with mean () and SD (). The expected
accuracy for double-pulse trials becomes the following:
Pe  1  0, e1  e2, 2. (5)
Time
Fixation
Targets on
Motion
Fixation point
Targets
Motion
Response
Delay
Motion
Delay
Go
Figure 1. Direction discrimination task with brief motion pulses. Subjects were asked to identify the direction of motion in a
dynamic random dot display, presented in one or two 120 ms epochs. The strength of motion was randomized across trials and
between the motion pulses, but the direction of motion (left or right) was the same for both pulses on double-pulse trials. The
interval between pulses ranged from 0 to 1.08 s. See Materials and Methods.
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We used the fit estimates of P1 and P2 (Eq. 1) rather than the observed
proportions because the former were more precise, but similar results
were obtained using the proportions. We compared the expected accu-
racy of the perfect integrator to the observed accuracy on double-pulse
trials using logistic regression, as follows:
Logit[Pcorrect] LogitPe , (6)
where Pe is the expected probability correct (Eq. 5). Positive  indicates
accuracies that are higher than expected. We also considered a perfect
integrator with knowledge of motion coherence associated with the two
pulses. To optimally exploit this knowledge, the evidence fromeach pulse
must be scaled by the known coherence (Gold and Shadlen, 2001).
To assess the effect of pulse sequence on choice accuracy, we fit the
following:
Logit[Pcorrect] 0  1	C2  C1
 2	C2  C1
, (7)
where C1 and C2 are motion strengths of the first and second pulses. 2
indicates how the accuracy changes from trials in which C1 C2 to trials
with a reversed sequence of motion pulses C2 C1. The null hypothesis
is that the accuracy does not change with the sequence of motion pulses
(H0:2 0).
To test for an interaction between the two pulses (e.g., a stronger pulse
1 reduces the effect of pulse 2) we used the following regression:
Logit[Pcorrect] 0  1C1  2C2  3C1C2. (8)
This regressionwas applied to all double-pulse trials. The null hypothesis
is that the increased efficacy of the second pulse was due to increased
sensitivity rather than an interaction of motion pulses (H0:3 0). Note
that 2  1 indicates greater sensitivity to the second pulse on the
decision.
Motion energy analysis.We examined the relationship between choice
and the moment-by-moment fluctuation of motion information in the
random dot stimuli. Due to the stochastic nature of the random dot
stimulus, the strength of motion fluctuates from trial to trial, motion
pulse to motion pulse, and moment to moment. The motion energy on
each pulse (Adelson and Bergen, 1985) was calculated by using two pairs
of quadrature spatiotemporal filters, as specified in Kiani et al. (2008).
Each pair was selective for one of the two opposite directions in our
experiment. The filters were convolved with the three-dimensional spa-
tiotemporal pattern of each motion pulse. For each quadrature pair, the
convolution results were squared and summed together, then inte-
grated over space to calculate the motion energy along the filter di-
rection as a function of time. The net motion energy displayed in
Figure 4 is the difference in motion energy along the stimulus direc-
tion minus its opposite.
The following regression analysis was used to test whether the differ-
ence betweenmotion energy profiles for correct and error responses was
larger for the second pulse compared with the first pulse:
E 0 correct response1 error response
M 0 1C 2E 3ES
S 0 first pulse1 second pulse
, (9)
whereC is the pulse coherence. E is an indicator variable for errors, and S
is an indicator variable for the pulse sequence. M is the integral of the
motion energy in a 200 ms window starting 50 ms after pulse onset. To
avoid overlap in the windows for the first and second pulse, only double-
pulse trials with nonzero interpulse interval were used in this analysis.
The null hypothesis is that the differences in motion energy profiles for
correct and error responses are equal for both pulses (H0:3 0).
We used logistic regression to test whether the choice was more influ-
enced by the motion energy of the second pulse than that of the first
pulse. The regression for double-pulse trials with equal motion strength
was as follows:
Logit[Pcorrect] 0  1C 2M1 M2 3M2, (10)
where M1 and M2 are the motion energy of the first and second pulses,
respectively. The null hypothesis is that the second pulse is not more
effective (H0:3  0). For trials with unequal motion strength, the re-
gression is modified to the following:
Logit[Pcorrect] 0  1C1  2C2  3M1 M2 4M2, (11)
and the null hypothesis is 4 0.
Results
Five human subjects reported the perceived direction of motion
in trials with one or two 120 ms motion pulses (Fig. 1). The
single-pulse and double-pulse trials were randomly intermixed.
The strength of each pulse, the motion direction, and the inter-
pulse interval varied randomly across trials. In double-pulse tri-
Figure 2. Choice accuracy in double-pulse trials was independent of the interpulse interval.
A, Accuracy in single-pulse trials. The curve is the fit of a logistic function (Eq. 1) to the data. B,
Accuracy in double-pulse trials with same pulse strengths. Horizontal lines show the expected
accuracy of a perfect integrator based on the single-pulse performance. Arrows show the value
of the logistic fit for single-pulse trials of similar motion strength. C, Accuracy in double-pulse
trials with different pulse strengths. Each data point represents pooled data from the pulse
sequence indicated by the legend and its reverse order (e.g., 3.2– 6.4% and 6.4–3.2%). Hori-
zontal lines show the expected accuracy of a perfect integrator based on single-pulse perfor-
mance. Error bars indicate SEM. coh, Coherence.
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als, pulses always had consistent direction. Subjects were
informed of this consistency and were extensively trained before
data collection to achieve high levels of accuracy (see Materials
and Methods).
Accuracy in double-pulse trials was independent of
interpulse interval
Although the motion pulses were brief, they reliably influenced
decisions about direction. As shown in Figure 2, accuracy im-
proved with motion strength and with the number of pulses. For
single-pulse trials, the accuracy ranged from 0.59 for 3.2% coher-
ence to nearly perfect (0.997) for 51.2% coherence, and the sub-
jects did not have any significant choice bias (Eq. 2,00.04
0.05, p  0.39). These single-pulse trials provided a baseline for
the comparison of performance in double-pulse trials.
Not surprisingly, performance accuracy improved in the
double-pulse trials (Fig. 2B,C). Importantly, this improvement
was apparent for all interpulse intervals. In fact, the performance
was largely unaffected by interpulse interval in the tested range
for both double-pulse trials with equal pulse strength (Fig. 2B; Eq.
3, p 0.1; Table 1, results of individual subjects) and those with
unequal pulse strength (Fig. 2C; Eq. 3, p  0.1). The evidence
from the first pulse was thus maintained without any significant
decay or loss during the interpulse interval. It is striking that the
two pulses separated by up to 1 s supports a level of accuracy that
is indistinguishable from a pair of pulses that are separated by 100
ms or by no gap at all (i.e., a single pulse with duration of twice a
single pulse).
Accuracy in double-pulse trials exceeded expectations based
on single-pulse trials
From the probability correct for individual pulses, it is possible to
predict the expected accuracy of a perfect integrator in double-
pulse trials. A perfect integrator would combine the motion in-
formation from both pulses, without loss. For same-coherence
pulses, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the motion evidence
would increase by 2 times that of the single pulse. This follows
simply because the expected sum of two independent random
samples is twice the sample mean, but the SD is only 2. This
increased SNR predicts an expected probability correct, which is
indicated by the solid lines in Figure 2B. Surprisingly, the ob-
served accuracy exceeded the predictions based on the perfect
integrator analysis (Eq. 6,   0.13  0.04, p  3  104). We
also observed high accuracies when the pulses were unequal (Fig.
2C; Eq. 6,   0.16  0.03, p  2.4  1010). In this case, we
entertained the possibility that the integrator could identify the
two coherences and optimally weight their contributions, but
even this unrealistic assumption led us to underestimate the ob-
served performance (Eq. 6,  0.07 0.03, p 0.006).
How is this possible? The perfect integrator analysis poses a
theoretical limit on the expected accuracy, but only if the subjects
were using all of the motion information in single-pulse trials
efficiently. If they ignored some information in the first pulse but
harvested more information from the second pulse, they could
outperform the expected accuracy based on single-pulse trials. In
other words, the better-than-expected performance in double-
pulse trials was actually explained by underperformance in
single-pulse trials.
If this hypothesis is correct, the accuracy should dependon the
order of pulses in the sequence. It predicts that subjects should be
more accurate when a strong pulse follows a weak pulse, com-
pared with the other way around. As shown in Figure 3, subjects
were more accurate in double-pulse trials with unequal pulse
strength when the stronger motion appeared second (Eq. 7, 2
1.16  0.38, p  0.002). Although accuracy was lower with the
opposite ordering, the weaker second pulse was still leveraged
more effectively than expected based on single-pulse presenta-
tions, consistent with the hypothesis that the second of the two
pulses is processed more efficiently (Eq. 6: weak–strong se-
quence, 0.21 0.04, p 1.5 108; strong–weak sequence,
  0.12  0.04, p  0.009). Moreover, this increased efficacy
was independent of the strength of the first pulse (Eq. 8, 3 
1.93 14.8, p 0.89).
Ina second testof this assertion,weexploited thevariabilityof the
random dot motion display to infer its influence on choice. The
motion information in the randomdot stimulus is stochastic,mean-
ing that there is variability in the motion energy (Adelson and Ber-
Table 1. Performance was largely unaffected by interpulse interval for double-pulse trials with equal pulse strength andwith unequal pulse strength
Subjects
Equal strength Unequal strength
3 4 3 4 5
S1 0.52 0.40 ( p 0.18) 5.1 6.3 ( p 0.41) 0.26 0.51 ( p 0.61) 0.25 4.0 ( p 0.95) 2.0 4.1 ( p 0.63)
S2 0.59 0.38 ( p 0.12) 4.5 5.4 ( p 0.41) 0.001 0.48 ( p 0.99) 3.8 3.6 ( p 0.29) 3.1 3.8 ( p 0.42)
S3 0.75 0.38 ( p 0.05) 9.5 5.3 ( p 0.07) 0.33 0.50 ( p 0.51) 6.5 3.9 ( p 0.09) 8.1 3.9 ( p 0.04)
S4 0.27 0.44 ( p 0.54) 3.1 6.1 ( p 0.61) 0.28 0.54 ( p 0.60) 0.70 4.1 ( p 0.87) 4.4 4.3 ( p 0.31)
S5 0.39 0.41 ( p 0.35) 4.4 5.6 ( p 0.43) 0.01 0.51 ( p 0.99) 1.3 4.0 ( p 0.75) 0.52 4.0 ( p 0.90)
Each row shows the coefficients of Equation 3 (mean SE) and their associated p values.
Figure 3. Choice accuracy depended on the sequence of motion pulses. Probability correct
for double-pulse trials with unequal pulse strength was calculated by pooling data across all
intertrial intervals. Overall, the weak–strong pulse sequence resulted in higher accuracy than
the strong–weak sequence. Error bars indicate SEM. *p 0.05, **p 0.01.
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gen, 1985; Kiani et al., 2008) of pulses sharing the same coherence
value. These fluctuations are known to influence the choice (Kiani et
al., 2008; Resulaj et al., 2009), and they can informus about the parts
of the stimulus that bear more strongly on the decision (Ahumada,
2002; Neri, 2004; Kiani et al., 2008; Nienborg andCumming, 2009).
Figure 4 shows the average motion energy for double-pulse trials
with equal pulse strength. The difference of the motion energy pro-
files for correct anderror responses is larger for the secondpulse than
the first pulse (Eq. 9,312.9 3.6, p 3.4 10
4), suggesting
a smaller influenceof the first pulseon thedecision.A logistic regres-
sion confirmed the influence of trial-to-trial fluctuations of motion
energy on choice (Eq. 10, 2 27.0 5.8, p 3.7 10
6) and a
larger influence of themotion energy of the second pulse (Eq. 10,3
 32.9  8.6, p  1.4  104). Similar results were obtained for
double-pulse trialswith unequal pulse strength (Eq. 11,4 22.7
6.0, p  1.4  104). The motion energy analysis thus provides
independent confirmation of the asymmetric influences of the two
pulses.
Discussion
Decisions are often based on fragments of evidence that arrive at
different times. To render a decision, the brainmust be capable of
combining the fragments and maintaining a neural representa-
tion of the combined evidence in the intervals separating their
arrival. Our experiment investigates this process in a simplified
setting. Subjects were shown two short pulses of motion stimuli,
which provided evidence for a common direction but often sep-
arated by a gap of time.Ourmain finding is that subjects combine
evidence across these gaps of time without loss, regardless of the
length of the gap interval. Comparedwith their performancewith
single pulses, subjects attained the same degree of improvement
from a second pulse whether it followed immediately or up to 1 s
after the first pulse. This implies that the state of the evidence
from the first pulse was stable through the gap. It does not leak or
drift away from the state attained at acquisition, and it can be
combined with the next piece of evidence.
Of course, many mathematical models of decision making
assume precisely this property of perfect integration (Wald and
Wolfowitz, 1947; Laming, 1968; Ratcliff and Smith, 2004;
Shadlen et al., 2006; Beck et al., 2008; Purcell et al., 2010; Smith
andMcKenzie, 2011; Brunton et al., 2013), but they do not spec-
ify how circuits composed of neurons can achieve it. Several
models, spanning a range of biophysical
realism, appear capable of supporting in-
tegration in the time span of many tenths
of seconds to seconds, despite time con-
stants of the neural elements an order of
magnitude faster (Hille, 2001; Wang,
2002). A common strategy is to balance
the natural decay modes of the circuit
with recurrent excitation such that the
network can hold a stable firing rate. Such
a network can operate as an integrator of
external input (Seung et al., 2000; Koula-
kov et al., 2002; Wang, 2002; Goldman et
al., 2003; Furman and Wang, 2008; Cain
et al., 2013).
One class ofmodels exploits inhibition
to achieve a competition among alterna-
tives, thereby coupling in a common dy-
namical framework (1) the integration of
momentary evidence and (2) the estab-
lishment of a commitment to a decision
(Wang, 2002; but see Lo andWang, 2006).
Thus, they are often characterized by stable point attractors—
decisional states—and network dynamics that push the state of
the network toward these point attractors. Such models success-
fully account for several aspects of the decision-making process
when the stream of evidence is continuous (Wang, 2002; Wong
andWang, 2006). However, they also predict that a temporal gap
in the stream of evidence, as in this experiment, will lead to sig-
nificant deviation from an ideal accumulation process. This is
because the state of the network evolves in accordance with its
inherent dynamics, even in the absence of evidence. If the gap
between the pieces of evidence is long enough, either a stable
decision point will be attained, based solely on the first pulse,
or the network will regress to its starting point, thereby losing
the initial evidence. The present findings pose a serious chal-
lenge for such mechanisms or any other mechanism that
would allow for drift in the decision variable toward one of the
choice alternatives in the absence of evidence.
There are potential remedies that would allow point attractor
models to act more like ideal integrators, for example, by adding
a mechanism that freezes the state of the network in the absence
of evidence, or by making the basin of attraction very shallow to
retard autonomous progress toward the attractor state. Another
possibility is to push the network into a parameter regime in
which strong momentary evidence makes the network “jump”
from the initial stable state to a decision state, while weak mo-
mentary evidence quickly decays and returns the network to its
initial state (Miller and Katz, 2010, 2013). If the decay is fast
enough, the performance of the network can become more or
less invariant to the interval between the momentary evidence.
However, in this parameter regime, integration is effectively
replaced by a sequence of mini-decisions based onmomentary
evidence. Thus, just like its conceptual predecessor—the high-
thresholdmodel (Laming, 2013)—this parameter regime loses
information.
Amore enticing remedy is to circumvent themajor limitation
of point attractor decision networks by replacing the choice at-
tractor states with a multi-stable attractor network (Seung et al.,
2000; Koulakov et al., 2002; Furman and Wang, 2008) in which
the stable states correspond to the values that the decision vari-
able could obtain. In the extreme, the number of stable states can
be so high that the network can represent a continuous variable,
Figure4. The secondpulse had the larger influence on choice. Each panel shows the averagemotion energy profiles for the first
and second pulses, sorted by choice. Only trials with equal pulse strength are included. The shaded region around the mean
indicates SEM. The black horizontal bars show the stimulus presentation period. Data were pooled for all nonzero interpulse
intervals. Motion coherences are indicated at the top of each panel: A, 12.8%; B, 6.4%; C, 3.2%. The units of motion energy are
arbitrary, but are identical for all motion strengths. The degree of influence on choice can be ascertained by comparing the energy
accompanying correct and erroneous choices (red and blue, respectively).
Kiani et al. • Evidence Integration Is Invariant to Cue Interval J. Neurosci., October 16, 2013 • 33(42):16483–16489 • 16487
or what is termed a “line attractor” (Seung et al., 2000). In recur-
rent network models (Usher andMcClelland, 2001; Wang, 2002;
Albantakis and Deco, 2011), this can be achieved by removing
nonlinearities and balancing the leak, recurrent excitation, and
inhibition among the integrators (Usher and McClelland, 2001;
Bogacz et al., 2006), although the balance must be exact.
Indeed, a known limitation of line attractor models arises
from their sensitivity to disturbance. Even the slightest noise can
cause the state of the network to meander along the stable states
and lose the stored decision variable (Pouget and Latham, 2002).
It has been suggested that this problem can be mitigated if the
network is composed of hysteretic units (Koulakov et al., 2002;
Goldman et al., 2003; Cain et al., 2013). Such robust models offer
a theoretical framework for biologically plausible networks that
can represent and integrate parametric values (Wang, 2002;
Machens et al., 2005).
In addition to the lossless representation of information dur-
ing the gap between pulses, we alsomade the peculiar observation
that subjects obtained more information from a second pulse.
We detected this by observing that subjects exceeded the pre-
dicted accuracy of a perfect integrator that used all the informa-
tion from the first pulse. The implication is that the measured
accuracy from the first pulse was suboptimal. This is supported
directly by estimating the accuracy of a perfect integrator for the
double-pulse trials and by the analyses in Figures 3 and 4, which
clearly indicate greater leverage of the second pulse on choice.
There are several ways to justify this suboptimal behavior. It
could arise because the subject curtails processing of the first
pulse prematurely, as in bounded evidence accumulation (Kiani
et al., 2008), but continues the accumulation process for the sec-
ond pulse (Resulaj et al., 2009) when it is shown. Alternatively,
the subject could boost the influence of the second pulse by pay-
ingmore attention to it (Treue andMaunsell, 1999; Reynolds and
Chelazzi, 2004) or through other means such as a time-
dependent increase in gain (Ditterich, 2006) or urgency gating
(Cisek et al., 2009; Miller and Katz, 2013). Among those, inade-
quate attention to the first pulse seems unlikely, since subjects
were clearly aware that they would receive only onemotion pulse
on a sizeable proportion of trials (14%). A leaky integration pro-
cess can lead to a larger influence of the second pulse too (Kiani et
al., 2008; Ru¨ter et al., 2012), but it is incompatible with the in-
variance to interpulse intervals, as explained above.
We speculate that in their attempt to achieve high accuracy,
subjects may have tried to ascertain information from the first
pulse about the trial type (i.e., one or two pulses) and difficulty.
For example, the probability of a second pulse is larger if the
coherence of the first pulse is low (see Materials and Methods),
and the coherences of the first and second pulse, were they
known, would support more accurate cue combination, compat-
ible with an optimal Bayesian strategy. Although subjects did not
actually benefit from this strategy, as evidenced by the subopti-
mal performance in one-pulse trials, the attempt might have led
to some loss of information, owing perhaps to a division of pro-
cessing resources.
In addition to explaining the improvement of performance
from single-pulse to double-pulse trials, the loss of information
on the first pulse explains why a strong–weak sequence would
lead to lower choice accuracy than a weak–strong sequence. Sim-
ply put, when the stronger pulse is presented first, curtailing its
impact is more detrimental. Regardless of the exact mechanism,
however, our observations suggest that the weaker influence on a
decision of the first of two samples of evidence may not be a sign
of forgetfulness or “integration leak” but the accumulation of
discounted early information by an otherwise perfect integration
mechanism—one that is capable of maintaining the fidelity of
accumulated evidence for at least 1 s while awaiting another in-
fluential fragment, morsel, or bit.
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